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L. Ashley Aull*
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright and education have a long, albeit somewhat 
troubled, history together, dating back to the first American 
copyright law.1  Long before its inception, the Copyright Act 
of  1976 generated  debate  between copyright  owners  and 
educators regarding the extent of their privileges and rights 
under the new law.  In hearings before House and Senate 
subcommittees on the 1976 Bill,  educational  and scholarly 
uses of  copyright  received more  attention  than any other 
topic.2  While  copyright  owners  have  very  rarely  sued 
educators,3 the boundaries  of  educational  privileges under 
the current  Copyright  Act,  including the limits  of  fair  use, 
remain highly contentious.  Representatives of educational 
interests decry the perceived contraction of privileged uses 
of  copyrighted  materials  for  educational  purposes, 
particularly those granted by fair use4 and specific teaching 
exceptions  to  the  public-performance  rights  of  owners.5 
Copyright  owners,  meanwhile,  adamantly  argue  that  such 
contraction  ultimately  produces  more,  and  better, 
copyrighted  material,  and  that  increased  damages—
particularly  statutory  damages—are  necessary  to maintain 
* © 2008 L. Ashley Aull.
* J.D.,  magna  cum  laude,  Harvard  Law  School,  2007.   Briefing 
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1
1
. See,  e.g., THE PAT.  OFF.  SOC’Y,  Proceedings in Congress During the 
Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J. 
PAT.  OFF.  SOC’Y 243,  277–282  (1940)  (following  the  passage  of  the  first 
copyright  act  in  1790:  a  bill  “for  the  encouragement  of  learning,  by 
securing  the  copies  of  maps,  charts,  books  and  other  writings,  to  the 
authors and proprietors of such copies”).
2
2
. Ann W. MacLean, Education and Copyright Law: An Analysis of the 
Amended Copyright Revision Bill and Proposals for Statutory Licensing and 
a Clearinghouse System, 56 VA. L. REV. 664, 664–65 n.5 (1970).
3
3
. But see Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983); Wihtol v. 
Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. 
Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
4
4
. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
5
5
. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(2) (2000).
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their incentives to create.6
Scarcity of case law fuels the educational debate, as no 
solid  precedent  provides  an  absolute  foothold  for  either 
producers or educational users.  Most high-profile cases on 
educational use involve fair use, which provides notoriously 
uncertain  immunity to  users  of  copyrighted works.   Other 
sections of the Copyright Act, also explicit in their favoritism 
of  teaching  practices,  suffer  from  few  precise  case 
applications.   Sections 110(1) and 110(2) of the Copyright 
Act provide clear, albeit qualified, exceptions to the public 
performance  rights  of  copyright  owners  for  classroom 
teaching  and  distance  education,7 but  have  produced  no 
reported cases defining their boundaries.  Similarly, very few 
cases  apply  § 504(c),  which  significantly  discounts—or 
eliminates—statutory  damages  using  criteria  that 
educational use would commonly satisfy.8
While  courts  have  had  only  limited  opportunities  to 
address  the  propriety  of  individual  educators’  teaching 
practices,9 it is clear that academics do not enjoy complete 
immunity  from  liability:  use  of  copyrighted  materials  by 
preparers  of  study  guides,10 biographers,11 and  other 
6
6
. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000).  See also H.R. REP. No. 106-216, at 6 
(1999) (noting, in support of the Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 
1999, that “Courts and juries must be able to render awards that deter 
others from infringing intellectual property rights.  It is important that the 
cost of infringement substantially exceed the costs of compliance. . . .”).
7
7
. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(2).
8
8
. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
9
9
. But  see  Wihtol,  309  F.2d  at  777  (denying  fair  use  defense  to 
individual  school  teacher  who created unauthorized rearrangement of  a 
choral piece, in order to make it suitable for school choirs); MacMillan Co. v. 
King,  223 F.  862,  867–68 (D.  Mass.  1914)  (denying fair  use defense to 
individual  tutor  who  developed  summaries  and  study  guides  based  on 
popular  economics  textbook);  Marcus,  695  F.2d  at  1172  (finding  public 
school  teacher  liable  for  incorporating  substantial  portion  of  another 
teacher’s copyrighted cake-decorating book into her own book).
10
1
. See, e.g., Educ. Testing Servs. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. 
Cal. 1999) (denying fair use defense—in large part based on special status 
of  secure  tests—to  for-profit  tutor  who  copied  test  questions  for  study 
guides);  Addison-Wesley  Publ’g  Co.  v.  Brown,  223  F.  Supp.  219,  225 
(E.D.N.Y. 1963) (defendants found liable for publishing and selling solutions 
manual to popular physics textbook); MacMillan, 223 F. at 862.
11 . See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068–72 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(reversing order of summary judgment on issue of fair use and remanding 
for  consideration  of  whether  defendant’s  incorporation  of  copyrighted 
letters  in  a  biography  would  diminish  market  for  the  owners’  own 
publication of the letters); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736–
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teachers and scholarly authors have all resulted in findings 
of  infringement.   Additionally,  owners  have  used  civil 
litigation  to  challenge  the  propriety  of  decreasingly 
expensive,  and  increasingly  accessible,  copying 
technologies,  targeting  large-scale  institutional  copying  of 
journals  and other  scholarly  materials  for  use in  research 
and  teaching.12  Particularly  in  suits  against  teaching 
institutions, infringement findings significantly impact actual 
practice.13
Thus,  educational  copyright  debates  take  place  in  an 
am-biguous  field  of  law.  Unfortunately,  they  also  use  a 
vocabulary  ill-suited  for  progress  or  agreement:  one 
characterized  by  polarized  rhetoric  and  misconceptions  of 
education’s  true  status  under  the  Copyright  Act.14  This 
paper  seeks  to  address  and  amend  this  unproductive 
42 (2d Cir. 1991) (determining that use of copyrighted letters of Richard 
Wright  in  a  scholarly  biography  was  fair  use);  Maxtone-Graham  v. 
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260–65 (2d Cir. 1986) (determining that use of 
copyrighted interviews taken from predominantly pro-choice compilation of 
experience with pregnancy by author of pro-life book was fair use); Kraft v. 
Kobler,  667  F.  Supp.  120,  126–29  (S.D.N.Y.  1987)  (rejecting  fair-use 
defense  of  author  who  incorporated  substantial  portions  of  copyrighted 
letters into a biography of composer Stravinsky).
12
1
. See,  e.g.,  Princeton Univ.  Press  v.  Michigan Doc.  Servs.,  99 F.3d 
1381,  1393 (6th  Cir.  1996)  (rejecting fair-use defense of  for-profit  copy 
shop that openly advertised that it refused to pay licensing fees for copied 
portions  of  articles  used  in  university  course-packs);  Am.  Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting fair-use 
defense  of  commercial  employer  of  research  scientists  that  had 
photocopied subscription journals by use of those in-house researchers); 
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1973), 
aff’d,  420 U.S. 376 (1975) (ruling that copying of journal articles by the 
National Institute of Health and National Library of Medicine for large-scale 
distribution to in-house research staff  was fair use);  Basic Books, Inc. v. 
Kinko’s  Graphics  Corp.,  758  F.  Supp.  1522,  1529–37  (S.D.N.Y.  1991) 
(rejecting  fair-use  defense  of  for-profit  copy  shop  that  failed  to  pay 
licensing fees for articles copied for university course-packs); Encyclopedia 
Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(rejecting fair-use defense of school system that engaged in large-scale off-
the-air taping and librarying of programs broadcast on public television).
13 . “After  Kinko’s . . .  many  copy  shops  that  had  not  previously 
requested  permission  from  copyright  holders  began  to  obtain  such 
permission.”  Princeton Univ.  Press,  99 F.3d at 1384.  Concerns for such 
impacts,  however,  sometimes  motivate  judges  to  avoid  findings  of 
infringement.  See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1356 (“There is no 
doubt in our minds that medical science would be seriously hurt if such 
library photocopying were stopped.”).
14 . See infra note  42 (discussing Paul Goldstein’s characterization of 
copyright “optimists” and “pessimists”).
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vocabulary,  by  suggesting—somewhat  heretically—that 
educational use, including fair use, has a price.15  The paper 
briefly reviews popular intuitions about educational freedom 
and copyright, and the related vocabulary of “users’ rights” 
and  “balance”  that  permeates  the  educational-privilege 
debate.   At the end of  the section,  the paper proposes a 
recharacterization  of  that  “balance”  as  a  price.   The 
following  section  contends  that  fair  use,  educational 
exceptions to the performance right, and statutory damages 
as a system of cooperative boundaries establish a statutory 
regime  of  price  discrimination  for  copyrighted  works, 
defining and patrolling the boundary between “educational” 
and  “general”  markets  for  copyright.   Finally,  the  paper 
addresses the types of private conduct that can impact the 
“price”  of  educational  use  within  this  market.   In  the 
aggregate,  this  discussion seeks to direct the attention of 
interested  parties  towards  the  real  variables  affecting  the 
cost and availability of copyrighted works for educators.
II. ON POPULAR INTUITIONS AND PESKY VOCABULARIES
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTUITIONS ABOUT EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM AND 
COPYRIGHT
Educational users of copyrighted works enjoy a popular 
presumption,  and some statutory  grant,  of  immunity  from 
liability  for  copyright  infringement.   The  intuition  that 
educational use of copyright should be free runs deep into 
the foundations of American copyright law.  The intuition is 
articulated  variously  as  a  concern  for  free  speech  and 
limiting authors’ power to control commentary,16 a concern 
for encouraging transfers that produce positive externalities 
on society,17 a concern for fulfilling copyright’s Constitutional 
15
1
. The pricing of all access to information has been characterized as 
“informational tyranny” in the context of debates about licensing.  See, 
e.g., Carol M. Silberberg,  Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-
First Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 646 (2001).
16 . See Jed  Rubenfeld,  The  Freedom  of  Imagination:  Copyright’s 
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (2002).
17 . See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
477–78 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,  dissenting);  Wendy J.  Gordon,  Fair  Use as 
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case  
and  Its  Predecessors,  82  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1600,  1607  (1982).   See  also 
Silberberg, supra  note  15, at 623 (“In copyright, the public benefit from 
distributing information is  not typically  included in an individual  buyer’s 
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purpose of  promoting science and the useful  arts,18 and a 
concern  for  the  preservation  of  long-accepted  practices.19 
Accordingly, several provisions of the current copyright act 
grant privileges to educators,  allowing them to use—at no 
apparent cost—copyrighted works without the permission of 
the owner: fair use,20 educational exceptions to performance 
rights,21 and decreased statutory damages in the event of 
infringement.22  However, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the  popular  presumption  of  immunity  far  exceeds  actual 
statutory  authority  for  educators  to  freely  copy  protected 
material.
Absent at least some immunity from the normal costs of 
copyright-compliance,  educators  indeed  might  face 
significant roadblocks.  As stated by Justice Blackmun in his 
Sony v. Universal Studios dissent:
There are situations . . . in which strict enforcement of [a copyright] 
monopoly would inhibit the very “Progress of Science and useful 
Arts” that copyright is intended to promote.  An obvious example is 
the researcher or scholar whose own work depends on the ability to 
refer  to and to quote the work of  prior  scholars.   Obviously, no 
valuation of a work.  Although society greatly benefits from distributing the 
work, the buyer is only willing to pay the value personally received.”).
18
1
. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  See also Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of 
Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62  OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 606 
(2001)  (“[F]air  use is . . .  consistent  with the constitutional  objectives of 
copyright in general: to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts.  The framers of the U.S. Constitution clearly intended that the law of 
copyright—including fair use—would be tailored to serve the advancement 
of knowledge.”).
19 . The assertion that long-accepted practice makes such use legally 
permissible, however, is doubtful.  One of the principle cases relied upon 
for support by academics wishing for broader privileges, Williams & Wilkins, 
in fact involved a significant—and problematic—deference to practice.  See 
487  F.2d  at  1350,  1353  (“These  customary  facts  of  copyright-life  are 
among our givens.”).  The court in Williams & Wilkins took for granted that 
a single hand-written copy made by an academic is a fair use when it noted 
that  it  is  “common  for  courts  to  be  given  photocopies  of  recent 
developments, with the publishing company’s headnotes and arrangement, 
and sometimes its annotations.”).  Later cases have explicitly rejected this 
reliance upon practice as proof of legal permissibility.  See Sony, 464 U.S. 
at 468 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is by no means clear that the 
making of a ‘hand copy’ of an entire work is permissible; the most that can 
be said is that there is no reported case on the subject, possibly because 
no copyright owner ever thought it worthwhile to sue.”); Am. Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco, Inc.,  60 F.3d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1994) (such “argument 
today is insubstantial”).
20
2
. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
21 . 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)-(2).
22 . 17 U.S.C. § 504.
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author could create a new work if he were first required to repeat 
the  research  of  every  author  who  had  gone  before  him.   The 
scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain 
with each copyright owner for permission to quote from or refer to 
prior works.  But there is a crucial difference between the scholar 
and the ordinary user.  When the ordinary user decides that the 
owner’s price is too high, and forgoes use of the work, only the 
individual is the loser.  When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior 
work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived 
of  his  contribution  to  knowledge.   The  scholar’s  work,  in  other 
words, produces external benefits from which everyone profits.23
As stated by another author: “[w]ithout paying someone 
to teach you or buying a book that explains Newton’s laws, 
you are not terribly likely to learn them merely because they 
are in the public domain.”24
Nevertheless,  the  intuition  that  educators  always 
deserve special treatment may be more modern than many 
scholars suspect—particularly those scholars who perceive a 
significant erosion of user privileges over time.25  Although 
the doctrine of fair use was born in the case of  Folsom v. 
Marsh in  1841,  that  very  case  denied its  application  to  a 
biographer’s  use  of  George  Washington’s  letters.   Justice 
Story did not consider the academic status of the defendant 
as  a  determinative  factor  in  his  analysis  of  infringement. 
Rather, Justice Story held that fair use was unavailable to the 
defendant—regardless of the defendant’s profession—“if the 
value of the original is sensibly diminished or the labors of 
the original author are substantially appropriated.”26
By 1914, when fair use had become well established in 
the courts,27 teachers still did not necessarily receive special 
23
2
. Sony, 464 U.S. at 477–78 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24 . Michelle  Boldrin  &  David  Levine,  Intellectual  Property  and  the 
Efficient  Allocation  of  Social  Surplus  from Creation,  2  REV.  ECON.  RES.  ON 
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 45, 64 (2005).  Boldrin and Levine, in fact, demonstrate that 
given any circumstance in which such sources are independently licensed, 
the likelihood of creation of a new work—or, say,  a teaching program—
incorporating all such sources decreases to zero as the number of required 
licenses increases.  See id. at 61.
25 . See,  e.g.,  Lawrence  Lessig,  Professor  of  Law,  Stanford  Univ., 
Keynote Address from the Open Source Convention: Free Culture (July 24, 
2002),  available  at 
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2002/08/15/lessig.html;  Siva 
Vaidhyanathan, Copyright as Cudgel, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 2, 2002, at 
B6 (citing James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism 
for the Net? 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997)).
26 . Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841).
27 . See,  e.g.,  West  Publ’g Co.  v.  Edward Thompson Co.,  169 F.  833 
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treatment under copyright law.  In  Macmillan Co. v. King,28 
the  District  Court  of  Massachusetts  considered  an 
infringement suit  brought against  an economics tutor who 
prepared  study  sheets  for  his  students,  based  on,  and 
quoting from, a popular  economics  textbook.  Despite the 
lack  of  any  evidence  showing  economic  harm  to  the 
plaintiff,29 the Court found that the copying had “resulted in 
an  appropriation . . .  of  the  author’s  ideas  and  language 
more extensive than the copyright law permits.”30  The Court 
explicitly rejected the suggestion that, as an educator, King 
deserved special leeway:
I am unable to believe that the defendant’s use of the outlines is 
any less the infringement because he is a teacher, because he uses 
them  in  teaching  the  contents  of  the  book,  because  he  might 
lecture  upon  the  contents  of  the  book  without  infringing,  or 
because his pupils might have taken their own notes of his lectures 
without infringing.31
Thus,  while  the  judge  took  for  granted  that  certain 
teaching  practices  using  the  book  would  have  been  non-
infringing, teacher status itself made no difference.
Thus,  although  there  is  a  strong  popular  presumption 
that  educators  deserve  special  status  in  copyright  law, 
neither  traditional  nor  modern  copyright  cases  fully 
recognize  an  educational-status-based  exemption  to 
intellectual  property  rights.   This  difference  between 
perceived  and  actual  immunity  creates  significant 
frustration,  particularly  when  many  educators  perceive 
licenses as prohibitively expensive or difficult to obtain.32
(E.D.N.Y. 1910), decree modified by 176 F. 833 (2d Cir. 1910) (considering 
the  fair  use  of  excerpts  from  copyrighted  case  reports  in  a  legal 
encyclopedia);  Lawrence  v.  Dana,  15  F.  Cas.  26,  61  (D.  Mass  1869) 
(“Examined as a question of strict law, apart from exceptional cases, the 
privilege of fair use accorded to a subsequent writer must be such, and 
such only, as will not cause substantial injury to the proprietor of the first 
publication . . . .”).  Some of the early cases apply fair use in a manner now 
more akin to the rejection of copyright in the underlying facts of a work. 
See, e.g., Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 144 F. 83 (7th Cir. 1906).
28
2
. MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
29 . Id. at 867.
30
3
. Id. at 866.
31 . Id.
32 . See Kristine  H.  Hutchinson,  The  Teach  Act:  Copyright  Law  and 
Online  Education,  78  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  2204,  2215–16  nn.52–59  (2003) 
(relaying interviews with various online educators frustrated by limitations 
imposed  by  their  inability  to  obtain  licenses  for  educational  use  of 
material); Carl Belz,  Unwriting the Story of Rock in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY: 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA 36, 38 (John Shelton Lawrence & Bernard 
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B. RHETORICAL PROBLEMS IN DISCUSSIONS OF COPYRIGHT AND EDUCATION
The long history of the intuition that educators deserve 
special  treatment  under  copyright  law  has  an  attendant 
vocabulary  of  educators’  “rights,”  the  use  of  which 
contributes  to  further  frustration  in  debates  between 
educational  users  and  copyright-holders.  With  respect  to 
both  educational  uses  and  copyright  generally, 
commentators  utilize  a  flawed  vocabulary  to  characterize 
users’  and  producers’  competing  interests  and  respective 
powers.  Discussions of users’ “rights” employ a terminology 
specifically intended to invigorate resistance to changes in 
copyright  law.  However,  the  language  of  la  résistance 
mischaracterizes  the  educational  users’  position  and 
conflicts with a dominant vocabulary of producers’ rights, all 
but  guaranteeing  discordant  discussions.  Even  more 
fundamen-tally,  the  “balance”  said  to  be  achieved  by 
copyright—and  disrupted  by  various  changes  thereto—
demands  reconsidera-tion,  particularly  as  it  applies  to 
educational  uses  of  copyright,  including  ever-troublesome 
fair uses.33
1. “Rights”
Educators concerned with current alleged imbalances in 
the state of  copyright  law—particularly  the impacts of  the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act,34 the Sony Bono Copyright 
Term  Extension  Act35 and  the  Copyright  Damages 
Improvement  Act36—propose  several  means  of  resistance, 
Timberg eds.,1980) (explaining the process of rewriting a book on popular 
music  in  response  to  resistance  from music  publishers  that  functionally 
disallowed use of lyrical clips in the work).  See generally  MARJORIE HEINS & 
TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 
26 (2005) (including several case studies of academics in different fields 
frustrated  with  prohibitively  expensive  or  complicated  licensing 
procedures).
33
3
. Fair  uses  are  often  described  as  “the  most  troublesome  in  the 
whole law of copyright.”  2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 145 (1976).
34 . Digital  Millennium Copyright  Act,  Pub.  L.  No.  105-304,  112 Stat. 
2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.).
35 . Copyrights—Term Extension and Music Licensing Exemption, Pub. L. 
No. 105-298, 11 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
17 U.S.C.),  held constitutional  by Eldred v.  Ashcroft,  537 U.S.  186,  208 
(2003).
36 . Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act, 
Pub.  L.  No.  106-160,  113 Stat.  1774 (codified as  amended in scattered 
sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.).
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centered on rhetorical  strategies designed to highlight the 
public’s  plight  in  copyright  law.37  The  Electronic  Frontier 
Foundation has taken a lead role in this rhetorical change.38 
The  resulting  rhetoric  of  desert  and  “rights”—common  in 
activist  circles39 but  also  in  occasional  court  opinions40—
provides little promise of producing effective debate, when 
used  against  the  dominant,  producer-based  rhetoric  of 
copyright protection.41  It provides an insufficient bargaining 
medium  for  owners  and  users  by  ignoring,  rather  than 
seeking to address and reduce, the cost of educational use.42
37
3
. Professor  Siva  Vaidhyanathan  explicitly  rejects  the  rhetoric  of 
copyright as “property,” noting that educators “can’t win an argument as 
long as those who hold inordinate interest in copyright maximization can 
cry ‘theft’  at  any mention of  fair use or  user’s rights.”   Vaidhyanathan, 
supra note 25.   Instead,  he advocates allegiance to one or both of two 
recent rhetorical strategies designed to reorient copyright towards users, 
rather than owners,  interests:  that  of the information commons, or that 
users’ “rights.”  Id.
38 . See generally  Electronic Frontier Foundation, Intellectual Property, 
http://www.eff.org/IP/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
39 . See,  e.g.,  DigitalConsumer.org,  Bill  of  Rights,  http://www.Digital 
consumer.org/bill.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2008) (providing that “users 
have the right” to various activities—including time-shifting, space shifting, 
and  translation—in  respect  to  legally  acquired  copies  of  copyrighted 
works).  The Electronic Frontier Foundation likewise speaks largely in of this 
vocabulary of freedom and rights: “At the same time, IP must be carefully 
limited to protect your rights to create, access, and distribute information, 
as  well  as  to  develop  new  ways  to  do  so.”   See Electronic  Frontier 
Foundation, supra note 38.
40
4
. See,  e.g.,  Princeton Univ.  Press  v.  Michigan Doc.  Servs.,  99 F.3d 
1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (Martin, C.J., dissenting) (“The fair use doctrine, 
which requires unlimited public access to published works in educational 
settings, is one of the essential checks on the otherwise exclusive property 
rights given to copyright holders . . . .  [I]t is the essence of copyright and a 
constitutional  requirement.”);  Harper  & Row, Inc.  v.  Nation Enters.,  471 
U.S.  539,  604 (1985)  (Brennan, J.,  dissenting)  (arguing that  the holding 
denying fair use to the Nation “effect[s a] curtailment in the free use of 
knowledge and of ideas . . . risking the robust debate of public issues that 
is the essence of self-government.”) (citation removed).
41 . See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417,  450  (1984)  (“The  purpose  of  copyright  is  to  create  incentives  for 
creative effort.”); Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219, 
228  (E.D.N.Y.  1963)  (“Of  preponderant  importance  to  the  Court  in 
evaluating the merits in doubtful cases . . . is the recognition by it of ‘the 
economic  philosophy  behind  the  (constitutional)  clause  empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights.’  That philosophy persuades that 
encouragement of  individual  effort  by personal  gain is  the best  way to 
advance  public  welfare  through  the  talents  and  authors  and 
inventors . . . .”) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
42 . Paul Goldstein has divided the rhetorical camps of copyright—those 
who support, and those who distrust, strong users’ rights as a method of 
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As a matter of doctrine, educational use is not a “right.” 
Fair  use,  although  championed  as  a  “right”  by  some 
activists, is more modestly conceived by most judges as a 
“privilege”43 equivalent  to  an  “exception  to  the  [owner’s] 
private property rights,”44 or simply “not an infringement.”45 
Over-application  of  the  privilege  threatens  the  right  of 
copyright owners and, according to the dominant rhetoric for 
copyright  protection,  ultimately  hurts  users  by  decreasing 
the  amount  of  copyrighted  work  that  is  produced.46  The 
rhetoric of user rights, particularly where it cooperates with 
the  rhetoric  of  “freedom”  to  use  copyrighted  works,47 
contributes to polarization of debates about proper copyright 
protection.   While  such  polarization  may  invigorate 
concerned citizens, it offers little promise of progress.
2. “Balance”
Canonically, scholars and judges alike describe copyright 
as the codification of  a “balance” between the interest  of 
authors in financial returns from their work and the interest 
of  the public  in  access  to that  work.   Through a grant of 
monopoly  power  to  authors—that  is,  an  almost-complete 
right to exclude—the copyright law ultimately promotes user 
access  to  art,  literature  and  other  original  creations. 
Exceptions for educational uses are considered an especially 
important element of this “balance.”  As stated in Williams & 
Wilkins v. United States,  “the development of fair use has 
been influenced by . . . tension between the direct aim of the 
achieving broad access to copyrighted works—into two camps: “optimists” 
and “pessimists.”  See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 15–17 (1994).  These labels should indicate the degree to 
which the  camps  are  unable  to  make progress  in  discussions  with  one 
another—few optimists can be reasoned into pessimism, and vice versa. 
Id.
43
4
. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 
1966).
44 . Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986).
45 . Sony, 464 U.S. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46 . See  Harper  &  Row,  471  U.S.  at  557  (“Respondent’s  theory . . . 
would expand fair use to effectively destroy any expectation of copyright 
protection in the work of a public figure.  Absent such protection, there 
would be little incentive to create or profit in financing such memoirs, and 
the public  would be denied an important source of  significant historical 
information.”).
47 . See Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 38 (“In each of these 
instances  and  many  more,  your  freedom  runs  up  against  intellectual 
property.”).
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copyright privilege to grant the owner a right from which he 
can  reap  financial  benefit  and  the  more  fundamental 
purpose of the protection ‘[t]o promote Progress of Science 
and the useful  Arts.’”48  The fair  use  doctrine,  along with 
explicit educational privileges, is said to “offer[] a means of 
balancing the exclusive right of a copyright holder with the 
public’s  interest  in  dissemination  of  information  affecting 
areas  of  universal  concern. . . .”49  Commentators  worry 
about  whether  the  balance—at  any  given  time—provides 
more benefit to users or producers.50
Scholars and courts consider changes in technology and 
user  practices  as  variables  that  affect  this  balance.   For 
instance, the court in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco 
stated  that  “the  invention  and  widespread  availability  of 
photocopying  technology threatens  to  disrupt  the  delicate 
balances  established  by  the  Copyright  Act.”51  Likewise, 
academic  commentary  surrounding  recent  legislative 
amendments to the Copyright Act bemoans disruption of the 
idealized balance embodied by the law.52  Many advocates 
identify primarily with users of copyright and express intense 
concern over the “tipping” of the copyright balance in favor 
of owners, away from the interests of users.53  The copyright 
balance thus teeters precariously between “free access” and 
“individual control,” and appears a matter of esoteric policy: 
metaphysical,54 impossible  to  optimize,  and  ever  on  the 
48
4
. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 
1973), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
49 . Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977).
50
5
. See,  e.g.,  Silberberg,  supra note  15,  at  620  (“Copyright  law 
balances  the  societal  benefit  of  public  access  to  information and  ideas 
against  the  need  to  provide  creators  with  incentives  to  produce.   As 
copyright  law  has  developed  judicially,  commentators  have  debated 
whether the creator or the public should be the primary beneficiary of the 
law.”).
51 . Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 
1994).
52 . See, e.g., Silberberg, supra note 15, at 620–621 (describing fair use 
as  an  important  element  of  the  copyright  balance,  the  contemporary 
limitations on which have negatively affected the balance).
53 . See,  e.g.,  Electronic  Frontier  Foundation,  supra note  38  (“In  the 
move  from  analog  to  digital,  offline  to  online,  this  delicate  balance  is 
becoming dangerously tilted, as legislators, courts, and IP holders push for 
ratcheting up IP rights.  EFF fights to preserve balance and ensure that the 
Internet and digital technologies continue to empower you as a consumer, 
creator, innovator, scholar, and citizen.”).
54 . See  Folsom  v.  Marsh,  9  F.  Cas.  342,  344  (D.  Mass.  1841) 
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verge of tipping in one direction or another depending on the 
actions of legislators, users, and producers.
The more one encounters articulations of this “balance” 
and prophecies of its imminent disruption, the more it begins 
to look like “price”: an actual value representing the point at 
which  producers’  and  consumers’  interests  meet,  for  a 
moment,  in  an  exchange.   Other  legal  scholars  recognize 
that  copyright  law allows  a  market  for  otherwise  “public” 
goods,55 but do not push further to recharacterize the basic 
“balance” at the foundation of American copyright law and 
educational  exceptions  as  the  “price”  resulting  from  that 
market.   However,  characterized as “price,” the “balance” 
achieved by copyright is neither esoteric nor unfamiliar  to 
the law or economics: it is the long-analyzed and recognized 
playing  ground  on  which  producers  and  consumers  of 
products  always  meet.   Changes  constitute  not  the 
disruption  of  an  ideal  status,  but  the  natural  reactions  to 
changing supply and demand, changing costs of producing 
copyrighted works, changing public interest in those works, 
and the public’s changed ability to substitute other goods, 
including pirated copies.  Thus the advent of photocopying 
technology  conceived  as  a  “threat”  in  Williams  &  Wilkins 
resulted not in a harmful “disruption,” but in a natural price 
adjustment.
C. THE COST OF “FREE” USE
The problem with this characterization of  “balance” as 
“price” is that it appears inimical to the basic presumption 
that educational use ought to be (as a matter of rightness), 
and appears  to  be (as  a matter  of  copyright  law),  “free.” 
Sections  107,  110(1)  and  110(2)  of  the  Copyright  Act 
explicitly  make  fair  use  and  teaching  exceptions  “not 
(“[C]opyrights approach nearer than any other class of cases belonging to 
forensic distinctions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, 
where the distinctions are, or at least may be very subtle and refined, and 
sometimes, almost evanescent.”).
55
5
. The canonical article on the economics of copyright law, by Richard 
Posner and William Landes, identifies the operation of the copyright laws as 
providing  legal  barriers  to  access  which  allow  for  the  alienability  and 
exchange of copyright products for adequate consideration, despite their 
otherwise being a non-excludable and non-rivalrous “public  good.”  See 
Richard Posner & William Landes, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325 (1989).
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infringements” of copyright.56  Thus, it would appear, at least 
facially,  that  owners  of  copyright  would  have  no  rights 
against  fair  users  and  teachers  who  would  enjoy  “free” 
access  to  copyrighted  works;  as  such,  educational  users 
should  be  able  to  access  such  works  without  cost,  and 
content-owners should be prohibited from manipulating the 
cost of—i.e., establishing a price for—access to their works.
Unfortunately for educators, however, the status of a use 
as “not an infringement” under the law does not reduce the 
cost  of  that  use  to  zero—even  for  uses  that  result  in  no 
economic  damage  whatsoever  to  the  copyright  owner. 
Although  educational  privileges  and  fair  use  appear  to 
prohibit the establishment of a monetary “price” for access 
to  copyrighted  works,  the  uncertain  boundaries  of  these 
privileges leave would-be educational users subject to a risk 
of  incurring  economic  damages  if  they  do  not  seek  the 
permission of content-owners.  Section 504 of the Copyright 
Act, which provides for statutory damages of up to $150,000 
per infringed work, creates an enormous potential cost for 
any unlicensed use that does not to qualify for the protection 
under §§ 107, 110(1) or 110(2).57  Even if determined in court 
to  be  copyright  infringements,  many  educational  uses 
produce  nominal  or  no  actual  damages  to  the  copyright 
owner.   However,  the  Copyright  Act  lets  owners  choose 
statutory  rather  than  actual  damages  as  an award  in  the 
event  of  infringement,  and  authorizes  judges  to  award 
whatever  per-work  value  they  consider  “just.”58  The 
traditional  rationale for such greatly increased damages is 
that actual damages may be hard to prove and that only the 
promise of a statutory award will adequately induce owners 
to invest in their copyrights.59  In any case, the availability of 
such awards drastically  changes the ex ante incentives of 
would-be  educational  users—where  there  is  even  a  low 
probability of such high damages, the expected cost of an 
unlicensed use of a copyrighted work is not zero.
Admittedly, courts tend to award low statutory damages 
without  evidence  of  profits  lost  by  plaintiffs  or  reaped by 
56
5
. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110(1)–(2).
57 . 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
58 . See id.
59 . Roger  D.  Blair  &  Thomas  F.  Cotter,  An  Economic  Analysis  of 
Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39  WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 
1651–52 (1998) (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 12.2, 12:34 (2d ed. 1996)).
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defendants.60  Even more  significantly,  statutory  damages 
have never  been awarded against  an  individual  teacher,61 
not  merely  because  such  damages  are  statutorily 
unavailable  in  many  cases  of  reasonably  presumed  fair 
use,62 but because plaintiffs apparently have not asked for 
them.  However, occasional awards of astronomical damages 
in borderline-educational contexts inflate the expected cost 
of infringement in the case of suit.63 Additionally, publishers 
have shown considerable  willingness  to  bring  suit  against 
low-stakes infringers in order to increase the deterrent effect 
of suit and encourage compliance with copyright law.  For 
instance,  Broadcast  Music,  Inc.  (BMI)  regularly  sues  small 
establishments  for  a  small  number  of  failures  to  obtain 
licenses to play music.64  In these suits, BMI consistently asks 
for statutory, rather than actual, damages.65  Thus, although 
the chances of awarding astronom-ical damages against an 
educator are very low, they cannot be discounted entirely.
Particularly  with  regard  to  fair  use,  insofar  as  the 
doctrine is applied on a strictly “case by case” basis and is 
resistant  to  generalization,  every  use  by  an  educator 
involves at least some risk of suit by a copyright owner.  The 
privilege  is  thus  famously  and  “inordinately  costly  to 
vindicate.”66  Though a defense to copyright infringement, it 
60
6
. Id. at 1667–68.
61 . This assertion is based on a review of every reported case in which 
statutory damages have been awarded.
62 . See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
63 . In  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  for  instance,  awarding  even  the 
minimum statutory damages—at the time $250 per infringed work—would 
have resulted in damages of  $93,000 against the public school system. 
See Encyclopedia  Britannica Educ.  Corp.  v.  Crooks,  542  F.  Supp.  1156, 
1185  (W.D.N.Y.  1982).   Likewise,  after  having  their  fair  use  defense 
rejected,  Kinko’s  was  ordered  to  pay  $510,000  for  just  twelve 
infringements.   See Basic  Books,  Inc.  v.  Kinko’s  Graphics  Corp.,  758  F. 
Supp. 1522, 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
64 . See, e.g., Broad. Music v. DeGallo, 872 F. Supp. 167 (D. N.J. 1995) 
(seven infringements).
65 . See id.
66 . Thomas  F.  Cotter,  Accommodating  the  Unauthorized  Use  of 
Copyrighted Works for Religious Purposes Under the Fair Use Doctrine and  
Copyright Act § 110(3), 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 43, 44 (2004).  Likewise, 
systems  for  compliance  with  other  aspects  of  copyright  law  are  also 
“cumbersome,  expensive,  and  slow.”   Duane  Webster,  The  Practical 
Realities of the New Copyright Laws: A Librarian’s Perspective (Dec.  28, 
2002) (transcript archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20060824053059/
http:// www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/webstermla02.html).
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is not a shield against all control of the copyright owner.67 
Additionally,  the  privilege  provided  to  educators  under 
§ 110(2)—a recently amended, highly qualified privilege for 
the limited use of materials in distance education programs
—has not been tested by courts, and applies to online uses 
to which copyright owners are particularly sensitive.
In  short—there  is  always  a  risk  of  suit.  It  is  not  a 
negligible  risk.  As  one  commentator  has  recognized: 
“Educators,  as  guardians  of  a  primary  public  interest, 
enjoy . . .  exceptions . . .  which give them a comparatively 
free,  if  somewhat  uncertain,  rein  to  use  copyrighted 
materials  in  their  teaching  activities.”68  Insofar  this 
commentator  recognizes  that  the  educators’  use  is  only 
“comparatively” free—which means cheaper, but not free—
and dependent upon risk, she is correct.  Statutory damages 
almost always remain a possibility. As such, every educator’s 
use of copyrighted works has an expected cost: the potential 
cost—i.e.,  statutory  damage  award  plus  litigation  cost—
multiplied by the probability of that cost being assessed.69
The content of the debate about educational use, then, 
is primarily a debate about controlling the cost for that use: 
§§  107,  110(1)  and 110(2)  set  limits  on copyright-owners’ 
abilities to set prices for educational use of their works, but 
they  do  not  entirely  eliminate  the  expected  cost  of 
“privileged”  educational  use.   The  following  section  more 
carefully  discusses  the  “cost”  of  educational  use,  which 
depends—for its existence—upon the Copyright Act’s grant 
of monopoly control to authors,70 and depends—for its value
—upon  varied,  subtle  aspects  of  the  Copyright  Act  which 
enforce a regime of price discrimination.71  The section will 
67
6
. But see Silberberg, supra note 15, at 621 (“fair use acts as a shield 
against the monopoly of copyright”).
68 . Maclean, supra note 2, at 666.
69 . See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: 
An  Analysis  of  Decision  Under  Risk,  ECONOMETRICA 263,  263–64  (1979) 
(describing general calculation for the utility of a decision made under risk, 
and noting the impact of risk aversion).
70
7
. See generally Landes & Posner,  supra note 55, at 328 (theorizing 
that  because  copyrighted  material  is  a  “public  good,”  absent  a  limited 
monopoly, “the market price of the book will eventually be bid down to the 
marginal  cost of  copying,  with the unfortunate result  that  the book will 
probably not be produced in the first place, because author and publishers 
will not be able to recover their cost of creating the work.”).
71 . Cf. Michael J.  Meurer,  Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 67 (2001) (“There are varied and subtle methods used 
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first  lay  out  the  statutory  mechanisms  for  this  price-
discriminatory regime,  and then will  consider some of the 
private actions of copyright owners that can manipulate the 
expected  cost  of  educational  use  within  statutory 
boundaries.
III. STATUTORY PRICE DISCRIMINATION: THE DEFINITION 
AND SEPARATION OF AN EDUCATIONAL MARKET FOR 
COPYRIGHTED WORK
Having abandoned conceptions of privileged educational 
uses as “rights” to free access under the Copyright Act, we 
can move forward to understand the means by which the Act 
creates, segregates and protects a market for these uses.  In 
fact,  the Copyright Act sets into motion an intricate price-
discriminatory regime that, exactly like more familiar private 
price-discrimination mechanisms, uses proxies to determine 
individuals’  ability  to  pay  for  copyrighted  material  and 
cordons  off  those  users  in  order  to  offer  them  different 
prices.72
The price-discriminatory elements of producer-set prices 
have been analyzed at length in several areas of copyright, 
from  the  pricing  of  Broadway  theater  tickets  to  the 
international  coding  of  DVDs.73 Economists,  in  particular, 
have devoted great attention to this area of copyright law, 
identifying key features of copyright law that facilitate price 
discrimination:  the  grant  of  limited  monopoly  power  that 
facilitates  market  power  among  content-producers  and 
restrictions  on  distribution  that  deter  arbitrage.74 Such 
analyses have assumed, however, that price discrimination 
by price discriminators to block arbitrage and measure preferences.”).
72
7
. In order for a producer to price discriminate, three conditions must 
be met: that producer must have (1) sufficient market power, (2) ability to 
match prices to differing categories of customers’ ability to pay, and (3) 
adequate methods for cordoning off separate markets of customers—with 
separate prices—from one another.  Meurer, supra note 71, at 59.
73 . See generally William R.  Johnson,  Creative Pricing in Markets  for 
Intellectual Property, 2 R. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 39, 39–41 (describing 
instances  of  price  discrimination  in  the  market  for  copyrighted  works); 
Meurer, supra note 71, at 59 n.5 (providing further examples).
74 . See Meurer, supra note 71, at 80–90 (noting that “most of the key 
provisions of the law affect the profitability of price discrimination,” and 
analyzing impacts on market power and arbitrage). See also Gordon, supra 
note  17,  at  1369  (“all  intellectual  property  operates  by  fostering  price 
discrimination”).
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is the voluntary and sole choice of copyright producers75 and 
that user privileges embodied in the Copyright Act generally 
“impede” producers’ ability to discriminate.76 These analyses 
have  overlooked  elements  of  the  Copyright  Act  itself—
including provisions for user privileges—that  mandate price 
discrimination  in  the  pricing  of  copyrighted  works  for 
educational users.
The  Copyright  Act  itself  establishes  a  system  of 
decreased damages and privilege which lower the cost  of 
copyright for a small  subset of users—namely, educational 
users.   At the same time, the Act demands limitations on 
those uses in order to limit the impact of the use on outside 
markets (limiting “arbitrage”).  Statutory damage provisions, 
the fair use defense generally, and the teaching exceptions 
in  §  110(1)–(2)  embody the boundaries  of  these exclusive 
markets.   Courts  engage  in  precise  line-drawing  between 
markets—based  on  factors  which  correlate  directly  to  a 
perceived ability  to  pay—in  a  way well-recognized  among 
private actors for copyrighted works,77 but rarely ascribed to 
75
7
. Meurer, supra note 71, at 91.
76 . Id.  at  61  (“[B]road  user  rights  impede  price  discrimination. 
Compulsory licenses and fair use are two doctrines that contribute to broad 
user rights and create obvious obstacles to price discrimination.”).
77 . Price discrimination by copyright owners is well-documented.  See 
generally Meurer,  supra note  71  (presenting  key  examples  of  price 
discrimination for copyrighted works and analyzing such practices’ effects 
on the distribution of welfare).  Among the most prevalent forms of such 
discrimination is  the “educational  discount,”  analogous to  that  provided 
intrinsically  by  copyright  law.   Thus,  for  instance,  Broadcast  Music  Inc. 
(BMI)  offers blanket  licenses to colleges and universities  for  all  music—
including concerts, student dining halls, etc.—at a rate significantly lower 
than  that  required  from  commercial  offices,  concert-promoters  or 
restaurant  owners.   See,  e.g.,  License  Agreement  from  BMI,  BMI 
College/University Music Performance Agreement (One Tier),  available at 
http://bmi.com/forms/ licensing/college58.pdf (providing for a per-student 
fee of $0.31 per year); License Agreement from BMI, BMI Business Multiple 
Use  License,  available  at http://bmi.com/forms/licensing/multilic.pdf 
(providing for a per-employee fee of up to $0.69 per year for the first 250 
employees);  License  Agreement  from  BMI  Music  License  for  Eating  & 
Drinking  Establishments,  available  at 
http://bmi.com/forms/licensing/ede.pdf  (providing  for  a  minimum  per-
occupant  fee  of  $2.45  per  year  solely  for  playing  of  recorded  music); 
License  Agreement  from  BMI  Musical  Attractions  Music  Performance 
Agreement,  available  at 
http://bmi.com/forms/licensing/musicalattractions.pdf  (requiring  payment 
of fee equal to 0.30% of gross ticket revenues per attraction for arena with 
up to 9999 seats).   BMI additionally discriminates between for-profit and 
not-for-profit performances of music.  See id. (for a concert with 9999 in 
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the government.
Likewise,  arbitrage  controls  appear  in  other  factors  of 
the  fair-use  analysis,  and  in  the  requirements  under  § 
110(1)–(2)  for  various  technological  controls  designed  to 
limit the leakage of educational-use copyright material into 
other more profitable markets.  Courts vigilantly patrol the 
boundaries between the resulting educational  and general 
markets,  and  exhibit  wariness  to  deem  educational  uses 
privileged  that  would  undermine  the  price-discriminatory 
scheme.78
A. DEFINING THE EDUCATIONAL MARKET
The first element of this statutorily established regime of 
price discrimination is its identification of different markets 
attendance, BMI charges a total fee of only $125 if the concert is a no-
charge benefit  concert,  but  otherwise 0.30% of  total  ticket  revenue for 
concerts  for  which  there  is  a  charge).   Software  companies,  likewise, 
provide  significant  educational  discounts—thus  discriminating  against 
educational  and  non-educational  users  (as  well  as,  frequently  between 
corporate and individual  users).   Such discounts  may be based less  on 
altruism than on an assessment of  educational users as having a lower 
ability or willingness to pay than business users.  See Hal R. Varian, Pricing 
Information  Goods,  June  15,  1995,  http://www.sims. 
berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/price-info-goods.pdf;  Meurer,  supra note 71,  at 
70  n.51  (providing  the  example  of  Microsoft’s  1999  price  list).   One 
wonders if the dearth of debate about educational fair use of software does 
not result  from the software companies  having successfully priced their 
goods below the expected cost of fair use.  Textbooks provide a glaring 
exception to the general rule—and college bookstores tend to charge much 
higher prices for books than normal bookstores, no doubt because college 
students must buy those books and thus have a higher valuation on them 
than the average, flexible reader.  Id. at 70 n.52 (college bookstores charge 
more  because  “student  customers  of  college  bookstores  have  a  fairly 
inelastic demand for required course books”).  See also Christos Cabolis et 
al., A Textbook Example of International Price Discrimination, Sept., 2005, 
http://www.econ.ucy.ac.cy/  papers/3-2005.pdf  (outlining  features  of 
general  textbook  market  as  well  as  hypothesizing  that  differing 
international  prices  for  identical  products  result  from  cross-cultural 
differences on willingness to pay, resulting from differences in valuation of 
education generally).
78
7
. Cf. William W. Fisher III,  Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1742, 1782 (1988) (“Accordingly, judges should watch 
for  situations  in  which  unauthorized  use  of  copyrighted  material 
undermines price discrimination schemes and should be chary of holding 
such uses fair. . . . The more that privileging the activity would undermine 
the  ability  of  copyright  owners  to  engage  in  price  discrimination,  the 
weaker the case for fair use, because price discrimination both increases 
the rewards available to creators (without increasing monopoly losses) and 
equalizes consumers’ access to works of the intellect.”).
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for copyrighted work.  At first, the law purports to admit only 
of one type of consumer and one type of producer: the bland 
personalities “A” and “B” of law-school exams and formalist 
analysis.   But  in  fact,  copyright  law  recognizes  several 
different  types  of  users:  religious  users,79 journalists  and 
commen-tators,80 public broadcasters,81 and educators.82  By 
singling out these groups for  reduced damages or  special 
privileges to use or perform works, the copyright law defines 
markets in which copyright is necessarily—on average—less 
expensive.83  Appropriate definitions of these markets ensure 
that the appropriate parties qualify for the “discount,” and 
ensure that reduced prices do not damage the marketability 
of works in non-identified markets.
The kind of price discrimination functionally instituted by 
the Copyright Act itself is third-degree price discrimination: 
that  which  gauges  a  consumer’s  ability  to  pay  (and  thus 
adjusts the cost of access) by some immutable characteristic 
of that consumer.  Second-degree price discrimination—that 
which  depends  upon  particular  behaviors  to  indicate 
willingness  to  pay—also  abounds  in  producer-side  price 
discrimination,  but  appears  less  common  under  the 
Copyright  Act,  which  prefers  categorical  line-drawing.84 
Third-degree  price  discrimination  requires  the  accurate 
determination  of  relevant  buyer  characteristics  which,  as 
closely  as  possible,  track  ability  to  pay.85  American 
copyright  law  has  visibly  struggled  to  find  these 
characteristics over time.
1. “Nonprofit” Status under 1909 Law and Modern Fair Use
Under  the  provision  of  the  1909  Copyright  Act, 
equivalent  to  modern  §  110(1),  educators  enjoyed  the 
benefits of a pure “not-for-profit” exception to copyrights in 
79
7
. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).  See generally Cotter,  supra note 66 (analyzing 
recent fair use cases involving religious uses of copyrighted material and, 
in some instances, affording them special treatment).
80
8
. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
81 . See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
82 . See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110(1)–(2), 504(c).
83 . Because, as previously discussed, the law thus decreases the risk of 
suit or magnitude of damages available against these parties, as compared 
to the risk of suit for a general user.
84 . See generally Meurer, supra note 71, at 74–76 (comparing second- 
and third-degree price discrimination methods used by copyright owners).
85 . See id. at 75–76.
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the  performance  of  musical  and  nondramatic  literary 
works.86  Pre-1976  law  explicitly  limited  the  owners’ 
performance rights in such works to performances that were 
“in  public”  and  “for  profit,”  thus  granting  broad  use 
privileges to performers not qualifying as either public or for 
profit.87  Although  educators  urged  the  retention  of  that 
exception  during  the  1976  revision  process88—because  it 
provided  a  great  and  rather  clear  boon  to  them  in  their 
activities—it  presented  obvious  problems for  the statutory 
regime.
This “not-for-profit” exception has been eliminated under 
current law because it failed to accurately identify a group’s 
willingness or ability to pay.  Large not-for-profit universities 
were  able  to  perform  huge  concerts  without  paying  for 
performance rights;. thus universities, although “nonprofit,” 
had the financial resources to compete with major for-profit 
institutions in their presentation of concerts and other live 
musical  events.89  The amendments  made to the sections 
redefine markets for copyrighted materials in order to better 
capture profits therefrom.
Under the fair use analysis, the “not-for-profit” exception 
persists  in  modified  form,  qualified  in  order  to  more 
accurately test for the user’s ability to pay.  The first factor 
of fair use analysis under § 107 involves the assessment of 
the “purpose and character  of  the use,  including whether 
such  use  is  of  a  commercial  nature  or  is  for  nonprofit 
educational  purposes.”90  The  distinction  between 
“commercial”  and  “noncommercial”  use,  here,  effectively 
translates  into  a  “for-profit”  and  “not-for-profit”  inquiry, 
favoring not-for-profit organizations and activities.  While “a 
finding  of  a  nonprofit  educational  purpose  does  not 
automatically  compel  a finding of  fair  use,”91 such finding 
86
8
. 17 U.S.C. § 1(c), (e) (West 1970).  See also Maclean, supra note 2, 
at  666–67  (noting  the  “for  profit”  exception  as  one  of  two educational 
exceptions to the monopoly right of copyright owners).
87 . 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (West 1975).
88 . See Copyright  Law  Revision:  Hearings  on  S.  1006  Before  the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. 
on  the  Judiciary,  89th  Cong,  1st  Sess.  (1965)  (remarks  of  Dr.  Harold 
Wigren, representative of the Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions 
and Organizations).
89 . See id.
90
9
. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
91 . Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1983).
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affords the defendant a presumption that his activity did not 
economically harm the defendant92 and makes a finding of 
fair use generally more likely.  Commercial use is presumed 
unfair.93
While  the  express  words  of  the  statute  direct  courts’ 
attention only to the character of the use, the character of 
the user often plays into this factor as well.  As stated by the 
Second Circuit in  Texaco: “Though [the defendant] properly 
contends that the court’s focus should be on the use of the 
copyrighted material and not simply on the user, it is overly 
simplistic to suggest that the purpose and character of the 
use can be fully  discerned without considering the nature 
and  objectives  of  the  user.”94  Some  judges  go  further, 
arguing  that  the  status  of  the  user  should  be  all-but-
determinative of the fairness of their use—so much so that a 
use,  even if  for  profit,  should be presumptively fair  if  the 
user  is  a  researcher.95  Attention  to  status  becomes 
particularly  acute  in  the  instance  of  non-profit  uses  by 
educators,  whose  identity  and  activity  is  unified  to  the 
extent  that  courts  interpret  §  107’s  preference  for 
“teaching, . . . scholarship, or research”96 to afford teachers, 
scholars and researchers a presumption of  privilege under 
fair  use.97  Thus,  although courts emphasize that  it  is  the 
character of the “use” primarily at issue under § 107, the 
status or identity of the would-be infringer plays a significant 
role in considerations of this factor.  For instance, research 
for a non-profit company gets drastically different treatment 
92
9
. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
451 (1984) (“[I]f the intended use is commercial gain, that likelihood [of 
future economic harm] may be presumed.  But if it is for a noncommercial 
purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.”).
93 . See  id.  at  451  (“commercial  use  of  copyrighted  material  is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs 
to the owner of the copyright”).
94 . Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 
1994).
95 . See,  e.g.,  Texaco, 60  F.3d  at  932  (Jacobs,  J.,  dissenting)  (“The 
photocopying was . . . integral to ongoing research by a scientist.  In my 
view, all of the statutory factors organize themselves around this fact.”).
96 . 17 U.S.C. § 107.
97 . See Sony,  464 U.S. at  477 (Blackmun, J.,  dissenting) (“There are 
situations . . .  in  which  strict  enforcement  of  [the  copyright]  monopoly 
would inhibit the very ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ that copyright is 
intended to  promote.   An obvious example is  the researcher or  scholar 
whose own work depends on the ability to refer to and quote the work of 
prior scholars.”).
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than  research  for  a  for-profit  company,  with  the  latter 
receiving considerably less leeway.98
2. Statutory Damages
Statutory damages play an additional key role in defining 
the boundaries of  the educational  market under copyright 
law.   The  statute  itself  provides  for  a  sliding  scale  of 
damages from the nominal ($200 per infringed work) to the 
crippling  ($150,000  per  infringed  work),  with  educational 
users  specifically  singled  out  for  the  possibility  of  zero 
damages in the event of an incorrect but good-faith reliance 
upon  fair  use.   However,  this  zero-bracket  for  damages 
explicitly  requires  that  the  defendant  be  a  member  of  a 
defined market.  Namely, in order for statutory damages to 
be remitted altogether, the infringer must be:
(i)  an  employee  or  agent  of  a  nonprofit  educational  institution, 
library,  or  archives  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  or  her 
employment  who,  or  such  institution,  library,  or  archives  itself, 
which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; 
or
(ii) a public broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular 
part of the nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity . . . 
infringed by performing a published nondramatic literary work or 
by reproducing a transmission program embodying a performance 
of such a work.99
The  most  significant  limitation—and  thus  the  most 
significant  “market”  definition—imbedded  in  this 
qualification is that the institution be non-profit and, in the 
case of educators or librarians under subsection (i), that they 
have “reproduced” the work in copies or phonorecords.  As 
such, the expected value of the copyright use is higher for a 
range of  for-profit  institutions and a range of  conduct  not 
considered reproduction.
B. ARBITRAGE CONTROLS: STATUTORY DEFINITION AND MAINTENANCE OF 
SEPARATE MARKETS FOR COPYRIGHTED WORKS
In concert, the provisions of statutory damages and fair 
use define the boundaries of the market in which there is the 
lowest expected cost of copyright production for a user: the 
market in which a member of a favored class of “educators” 
or “researchers” engages in nonprofit activity, for a nonprofit 
98
9
. See, e.g., Texaco, 37 F.3d at 899.
99 . 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
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institution.   The  statutory  regime  keeps  the  nonprofit 
educational  market  stable  and  containable  enough  to  be 
afforded  a  discount  on  copyrighted  works  without  risking 
arbitrage into the “normal” market.  It maintains a group of 
discount users discrete enough that their existence does not 
“impair[]  the  copyright  holder’s  ability  to  demand 
compensation from (or deny access to) any group who would 
otherwise  be  willing  to  pay. . . .”100  As  such,  statutory 
regimes governing—and courts analyzing—educational uses 
exhibit  as  much  concern  for  the  permeability  of  the 
boundary between the educational and normal markets as 
for that boundary’s location.
In order to avoid arbitrage—the “leakage” of low prices 
across  the  boundary  from the  educational  to  the  general 
market—copyright  law  incorporates  a  series  of  explicit 
requirements,  weighing analyses and other provisions that 
only  allow educators  to  obtain  lower-cost  uses when they 
have  engaged  in  an  activity  that  does  not  pose  an 
unreasonable  risk  of  “leaking” low prices  into the general 
market. These arbitrage controls appear explicitly in § 110, 
and more subtly in the fair use analysis under § 107.101
1. Educational Privileges Under Sections 110(1) and 110(2)
Arbitrage controls are most explicit in the context of the 
§ 110(1)  and  § 110(2)  teaching  exceptions,  which—
particularly since revisions in 2002 under the TEACH Act—
require physical or technological quarantining of works used 
for  educational  purposes,  to avoid  their  leaking into other 
markets and thereby decreasing non-educational demand.102 
These  sections  provide  that,  notwithstanding  the  rights 
granted to copyright-holders by § 106 of the Copyright Act, 
“the following are not infringe-ments to copyright”:
(1) performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils in the 
course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational 
institution,  in  a  classroom  or  similar  place  devoted  to 
instruction . . . ; [and]
(2) . . . the performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work 
or reasonable limited portions of any other work, or display of a 
work in an amount comparable to that which is typically displayed 
100
1
. Sony, 464 U.S. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101 . 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110(1)–(2).
102 . Technology,  Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002 
[hereinafter TEACH Act], Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1910 (codified as 
amended in scattered section of 17 U.S.C.).
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in the course of a live classroom session, by or in the course of a 
transmission . . . .103
Both  of  these  exceptions  are,  themselves,  subject  to 
significant qualifying conditions. Section 110(2) in particular 
articulates  a  series  of  highly-specific  requirements  for  an 
insti-tution  and  a  particular  use  to  qualify  as  a  non-
infringement: the performance or display must be made by 
or  under  the  supervision  of  an  instructor;  it  must  be  an 
integral part of a class session; it must be directly related 
and of material assistance to instruction; it must be made 
solely for and be limited to students officially enrolled in the 
course; and the transmitting institution must have instituted 
strict access-controls and copyright policies.104
These sections, in fact, constitute arbitrage controls for 
the  educational-use  market.   Section  110(1)  requires  the 
ultimate in arbitrage control—physical encapsulation.  That 
section privileges educational  performance or  display  of  a 
work only if such performance or display takes place “in the 
course  of  face-to-face  teaching  activities  of  a  nonprofit 
educational  institution,  in  a  classroom  or  similar  place 
devoted  to  instruction.”105  Particularly  in  light  of  the 
limitations read into this section by its sister-section 110(2), 
“similar place devoted to instruction” does not admit much 
expansion—certainly, not to any form of broadcast.
As originally enacted in 1976, § 110(2) was considered 
sufficient—in  concert  with   §  110(1)—to  “cover  all  of  the 
various methods by which performances or displays in the 
course of systematic instruction take place.”106  Up until its 
2002 revision, however, § 110(2) was limited to educational 
performances  of  nondramatic  literary  or  musical  works  or 
displays  of  a  work  if  the  transmission  was  received  in  a 
classroom,  displays  to persons necessarily  in  other  places 
due to disability or other special circumstances, and displays 
to  officers  of  the  government.107  This  limitation  provided 
ample comfort to copyright owners, who could be assured 
that  the  teaching  exception  could  not  result  in  broadcast 
beyond  closed-circuit  television.   However,  the  provision 
significantly hampered the development of  online distance 
103
1
. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(2).
104 . Id. § 110(2)(A)–(D).
105 . Id. § 110(1) (emphasis added).
106 . H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 81 (1976).
107 . 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (West 1976).
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education programs, which—by not enjoying the benefits of § 
110(1) or § 110(2)—paid significantly higher costs for use of 
teaching  materials.108  After  a  long  process  of  public 
comment and consideration, Congress significantly altered § 
110(2)  to  accommodate  those  online  distance-education 
practices.109
The modified § 110(2) responded significantly to fears of 
copyright  owners  that  allowance  of  certain  performances 
and  displays  over  the  internet—even  in  the  context  of 
educational  use—would  lead  to  broader  damage  to  their 
markets  because  of  the  ease  of  digital  piracy  and 
inadequacy  of  most  digital-rights  management  systems.110 
The provision thus includes an explicit arbitrage control that 
requires  institutions  to  take  adequate  technological 
precautions against  downstream piracy.111  In  particular,  § 
110(2)(D)  requires  the  institution  in  which  a  particular 
teacher  works  to  “institute[]  policies  regarding  copyright” 
and  “apply  technological  measures  that  reasonably 
prevent . . . unauthorized further dissemination of the work 
in accessible form by . . .  recipients to others.”112  The law 
thus  requires  that  teachers  covered  by  the  section  avoid 
creation  of  unreasonable  risk  of  down-stream  piracy 
following  their  educational  use.   A  use  is  not  privileged 
whatsoever under § 110(2) if it poses such an unreasonable 
108
1
. See generally Laura N. Gasaway, Distance Learning and Copyright: 
An  Update,  49  J.  COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 195,  200  (2001)  (“The  current 
Copyright Act recognizes the unique position and importance of education 
by providing crucial  exemptions to the exclusive rights of the copyright 
holder.  Unlike  the  exemption  for  face-to-face  teaching,  however, 
instructional transmission (i.e., distance education) is not so favored.”).
109 . See TEACH Act, supra note 102.
110 . The dangers of piracy and the inadequacy of protections dominated 
the publisher-side comments about proposed amendments to the act.  See, 
e.g., Comments from the American Society of Journalists and Authors to the 
United  States  Copyright  Office,  Office  of  Policy  and International  Affairs 
(Feb.  4,  1999),  available  at 
http://www.copyright.gov/disted/comments/init007.pdf;  Comments  from 
the Motion Picture Association of America to the United States Copyright 
Office, Office of Policy and International Affairs (Feb. 5, 1999), available at 
http://copyright.gov/disted/comments/init022.pdf (“greater protections are 
necessary  to  stimulate  the  production  and  dissemination  of  works 
necessary to carry out effective distance education activities”); Comments 
from the Recording Industry Association of America to the United States 
Copyright Office, Office of Policy and International Affairs (Feb. 5, 1999), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/disted/comments/init023.pdf.
111 . See Hutchinson, supra note 32, at 2222.
112 . 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(2)(D)(i)–(ii)(I)(bb).
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risk.   This  provision of  the law thus reinforces the barrier 
between  the  “educational”  market  and  the  “general 
market,”  and  imposes  technological  arbitrage  controls  to 
prevent leakage from one market into another.113
2. Fair Use
Fair use imposes further arbitrage controls, particularly 
under the fourth factor analyzed by courts under § 107: “the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.”114  As interpreted by Justice Blackmun 
in Sony, in order to successfully plead fair use, “the infringer 
must demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright 
holder’s ability to demand compensation from (or to deny 
access to) any group who would otherwise be willing to pay 
to see or hear the copyrighted work.”115
Analysis of this factor in the fair-use analysis is as old as 
the  doctrine  itself—referenced,  even,  in  the  “first” 
articulation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh:
[W]e  must  often,  in  deciding questions  of  this  sort,  look  to  the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value 
of  the  materials  used,  and  the  degree  in  which  the  use  may 
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects,  
of the original work.116
Although  the  Supreme  Court  has  disavowed  its  once-
articulated  view  that  this  is  the  most  important  factor 
considered in the fair-use analysis,117 lower courts certainly 
continue to give this factor special weight.118
Many criticisms of fair use point out that this “definition-
of-the-market”  test  is  circular,  insofar  as  in  some  sense 
113
1
. Viewed in this context,  copyright owners’  particular resistance to 
extensions of fair use on the internet, and litigiousness in that area, may be 
viewed as recognition that arbitrage controls appear—at least as of yet—
weaker in the internet sphere.  It is difficult to assure copyright owners of 
the non-market-impacting use of a particular work where the medium of its 
usage is notorious for leakage.
114 . 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
115 . Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 485 
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116 . Folsom v.  Marsh,  9  F.  Cas.  342,  348 (D.  Mass.  1841)  (emphasis 
added).
117 . See  Campbell  v.  Acuff-Rose  Music,  510  U.S.  569,  594  (1994); 
Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
118 . See,  e.g., Princeton Univ.  Press  v.  Michigan Doc.  Servs.,  99 F.3d 
1381, 1387–89 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 
F.3d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1994).
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every instance of fair use will result in harm to the plaintiff’s 
market—plaintiff will lose its right to refuse access or charge 
at least one licensing fee to the defendant at issue.119  This 
test functions coherently, however, if  the world of users is 
divided into two markets, and the factor works to patrol the 
boundary between those markets.  As stated by the majority 
of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Harper  &  Row:  fair  use  is 
unavailable  if,  “should  [the  challenged  use]  become 
widespread, it  would adversely affect the  potential market 
for the copyrighted work.”120  The Court, in such passages, 
functionally  separates  the  market  for  copyright  into  two 
distinct markets—one in which the copyright holder has no 
right to exclude and may not directly charge for access to 
his works (the fair-use market) and the other in which all of 
the  rights  under  the  copyright  act  apply  (the  general  or 
“potential” market).121  Courts thus determine every instance 
of fair use by reference to its impact on the permeability of 
the  line  between  the  fair-use  market  and  the  general 
market,  attempting  to  avoid  “major  inroads”  from  one 
market  into  the  other.122  If,  all  other  factors  weighing  in 
favor of the fair user, a finding of fair use would harm the 
119
1
. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1407 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting) 
(“the majority’s logic would always yield a conclusion that the market had 
been harmed because any fees that a copyright holder could extract from 
a user if the use were found to be unfair would be ‘lost’ if the use were 
instead found to be ‘fair use.’”);  see also Fisher,  supra note  78, at 1671 
(“[I]n almost every case in which the fair use doctrine is invoked, there will 
be  some  material  adverse  impact  on  a  ‘potential  market’  as . . .  the 
Court . . . define[s] the phrase . . . .  To permit the defendant to engage in 
the activity  for  free prevents  the plaintiff  from exacting a fee from the 
defendant.  Thus, in all but the rare cases in which the defendant for some 
reason would be unwilling to pay the plaintiff anything, a finding that the 
defendant’s conduct is ‘fair’ will ‘impair the marketability of the work.’”); 
Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124 
(1990) (“By definition every fair use involves some loss of royalty . . . .”). 
See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 n.19 
(Ct.  Cl.  1973),  aff’d,  420 U.S.  376 (1975)  (“It  is  wrong to  measure  the 
detriment  to  plaintiff  by  loss  of  presumed  royalty  income—a  standard 
which necessarily assumes that plaintiff had a right to issue licenses. . . . 
In determining whether the company has been sufficiently hurt to cause 
these practices to become “unfair,” one cannot assume at the start  the 
merit of the plaintiff’s position, i.e., that plaintiff had the right to license.”).
120 . Harper & Row,  471 U.S.  at  568 (quoting  Sony,  464 U.S.  at  451) 
(emphasis added).
121 . “In the economists’ view, permitting ‘fair use’ to displace normal 
copyright channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate 
public benefit.”  Id. at 566 n.9.
122 . Sony, 464 U.S. at 481 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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border  between  the  fair  use  and  general  market—thus 
permitting  significant  arbitrage  and  detracting  from  the 
value of the copyright within the general market—it may not 
be deemed fair.
Concern for the clear division of the educational market 
from  the  general  market  explains  the  apparent  de  facto 
exclusion  of  some  entire  genres  from fair  use—genres  in 
which the general  market  is  the educational  market.   For 
example,  secure  tests—such  as  the  SAT  or  LSAT—do  not 
permit  fair  use;  in  fact,  Congress  specifically  stated  an 
intention,  upon  codification  of  § 107,  not  to  “reduce  the 
protection for secure tests, the utility of which is especially 
vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure.”123  Similarly, fair use 
is unlikely to apply to classroom copies made of textbooks 
and other materials produced specifically for classroom use, 
since such copies represent non-permissive use of materials 
in their “general” market.124  Additionally, biographers seem 
partic-ularly susceptible to findings of infringement for use of 
the letters of their subjects, particularly where the heirs of 
said subject express interest in publication of those letters 
themselves.125  And the Supreme Court has explicitly stated 
that first  publication rights—in that “only one person” can 
exercise  them—are  less  likely  to  permit  fair  uses.126 The 
weakness of fair use in these contexts is consistent with a 
view  of  the  doctrine  as  attempting  to  define  a  strict 
boundary  between  multiple  markets:  general  and 
educational.  Claims of fair use, for uses within the general 
market pose a great risk of destroying a principled division 
between  markets,  and  are  thus  rejected.   Uses  which 
supplant  “any  part  of  the  normal  market”  are 
infringements.127
123
1
. Educ. Testing Servs. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 
1999).
124 . “With  respect  to  the  fair  use  doctrine,  ‘[t]extbooks  and  other 
material prepared primarily for the school market would be less susceptible 
to reproduction for classroom use than material prepared for general public 
distribution.’” Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 
H.R.  REP. NO. 90-83, at 34 (1967)).  Such materials also are also explicitly 
excluded  from  the  exceptions  granted  for  distance  education  under  § 
110(2).  17 U.S.C. § 110(2).
125 . See, e.g., cases cited supra note 11.
126 . Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553.
127 . H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 34 (1967).  Thus, in finding fair use in Wright, 
the court was required to emphasize that the defendant’s biography “does 
not pose a significant threat to the potential market for Wright’s letters or 
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The fair use analysis, so considered, not only recognizes 
but actively defends the separation of two distinct markets 
for  copyrighted  works,  and—on  a  case  by  case  basis—
determines the boundaries of the fair-use market so as to 
maintain  its  distinctiveness  from  the  general  market.128 
Case-by-case findings of fair use which would tend towards 
significant intrusion upon the general market are rejected.129 
All other factors being equal,130 more insular uses are more 
likely to be found fair, and thus come at a significantly lower 
expected cost for educational users.
IV. OTHER INFLUENCES ON THE PRICE OF EDUCATIONAL USE
While the Copyright Act—both in form and in function—
defines  a  separate  and  lower-cost  market  for  educational 
use,  the  lack  of  quantified  clarity  in  the  law  allows  for 
additional,  non-statutory,  factors  to  affect  the  price  of 
educational use.  As this section will discuss, in addition to 
statutory  influences  on  price—quantifiable  factors  which 
define  damages  and  delineate  immunities  from  copyright 
infringement—two additional  factors  influence the ultimate 
“price” of educational use.  First, lack of certainty about the 
boundaries of fair use and other privileges impacts the real 
and  perceived  price  of  use.   Second,  the  enforcement 
strategies  of  copyright  owners themselves impact  prices—
both  by  manipulating  uncertainty  and  by  changing  the 
chance  of  suit  against  particular  groups  of  users. 
Commentators  have  recognized  these  factors  but  not 
journals . . . .   Impairment  of  the  market  for  these  works  is  unlikely.” 
Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991).
128
1
. The Guidelines to Educational Copyright provide further insight into 
the arbitrage controls which are built into the copyright law through fair 
use  provisions.   One  commentator  explicitly  noted  that  the 
“temporariness” factor read into fair use by the House Report appears to 
be intended to prevent circulation of copies beyond members of the class—
itself a “reasonable limitation to prevent encroachment on the copyright 
owner’s market.”  See MacLean,  supra note 2, at 671 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
90–83, at 29–37 (1967)).  MacLean suggests that the requirement might be 
fulfilled  by “systematic  recall”  of  all  distributed  copies  at  the  end  of  a 
semester or year.
129 . See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552.
130 . Though,  in  particular,  the  quantity  of  copying  may  also  work 
towards the same goal of assessing the insularity of an expected fair use: 
the more of a work that is copied, or the more copies that are created, the 
more likely is free access to the work by general market customers.
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grappled  with  them  as  price-setting  techniques,131 which 
have successfully increased risk-averse behavior on the part 
of  educators132 and  made  licenses  cheaper  than  reliance 
upon statutory privileges.
A. MANIPULATION OF UNCERTAINTY UNDER AN UNCLEAR LEGAL STANDARD
Various  elements  of  educational  privileges  under 
copyright  law  make  the  position  of  teachers  and  other 
educators uncertain.  Typically, educators decry the case-by-
case and weighing analysis under fair use, a doctrine that 
“many  find  unpredictable,  if  not  incomprehensible.”133 
During the process leading up to the enactment of the 1976 
Act,  and  once  since,  educators  and  copyright  owners 
unsuccessfully  attempted  to  negotiate  binding,  bright-line 
rules governing fair use.134  These attempts failed; even the 
Guidelines  for  Classroom  Copying  incorporated  into  the 
statutory history of fair use note that copyright beyond the 
defined bright-line area may or may not be fair use.135  The 
131
1
. See,  e.g.,  Webster,  supra note  66  (“Where  uncertainty  about 
permissible use exists, liability concerns may lead librarians to forego uses 
that are actually permitted under the copyright law.”).
132 . Consider, for instance, the number of educational institutions which 
have adopted strict, bright-line “fair use” policies much more conservative 
than the statutory grant of immunity following a suit by publishers against 
New York University.   See 1983-1984 Copyright L.  Dec.  (CCH) P25,  544 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stipulated order and final judgment pursuant to settlement 
agreement  between  Addison-Wesley  Publishing,  et  al.,  and  New  York 
University).  The NYU settlement, though unpublished, is partially reprinted 
in Eric D. Brandfonbrener,  Fair Use and University Photocopying: Addison-
Wesley  Publishing  v.  New  York  University,  19  U.  MICH.  J.  LEGAL REF.  669 
(1986).
133 . Naomie Abe Voegtli,  Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK L. REV. 
1213,  1266  (1997).   Its  case-sensitivity  is  so  profound  that  one 
commentator  has  called  “counterfactual”  the  assumption  that  a 
knowledgeable  actor  could  determine  in  advance  whether  his  behavior 
constituted fair use. Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 17.
134 . See generally Crews, supra note 18, at 608–11.
135 . H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68 (“The parties agree that the conditions 
determining the  extent  of  permissible  copying for  educational  purposes 
may change in the future; that certain types of copying permitted under 
these guidelines may not be permissible in the future; and conversely that 
in the future other types of copying not permitted under these guidelines 
may  be  permissible  under  revised  guidelines.   Moreover,  the  following 
statement  of  guidelines  is  not  intended  to  limit  the  types  of  copying 
permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial decision and which 
are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright Revision Bill.   There may be 
instances in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines stated 
below may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.”).
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Supreme Court has emphasized that “fair use analysis must 
always be tailored to the individual case.”136
Depending on the magnitude and the context of  such 
uncertainty  concerning  legal  rules,  affected  parties  may 
either over- or under-comply with the stated rule—they may 
either become more risk-averse than warranted (relying less 
upon  fair  use)  or  less  risk-averse  than  warranted  (relying 
excessively upon fair use).  As stated by Professors Richard 
Craswell and John Calfee:137
Real  enforcement  institutions  always  involve  some  degree  of 
uncertainty  and . . .  that  uncertainty  can  change  the  incentives 
created by the legal rules in unexpected ways. In some cases, it 
can lead to  more  deterrence  than would  be socially  optimal;  in 
other cases, it can lead to far less.138
According to Craswell and Calfee, overcompliance with a 
particular law is likely to be common—even for risk-neutral 
parties—if the uncertainty is “relatively small”;  conversely, 
broad  uncertainty  is  more  likely  to  lead  to 
undercompliance.139  Ultimately, there is no way to tell which 
of these two effects will dominate: but anecdotal evidence 
may provide support for a given hypothesis.140
Within  different  segments  of  the  educational-use 
community,  both  under-  and  over-compliance  appear 
common.   Many  educational  users  who  publish  on  the 
subject either explicitly recognize or exhibit  under-reliance 
upon fair  use in  the educational  community.   Institutional 
users, for instance, have wedded themselves to extremely 
conservative  internal  fair  use  policies;141 individuals, 
expressing  anxiety  about  their  lack  of  knowledge  of  the 
scope of possible liabilities, simply fail to rely upon fair use 
or  other privileges.142  Simultaneously,  many teachers and 
educators simply assume that what they do must be legal—
and,  as  such,  perhaps  tread  too  far  into  the  area  of 
unprotected activities under an assumption that because of 
the nonprofit, educational nature of their activities they are 
136
1
. Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985).
137 . Professor of Economics at the University of Southern California and 
representative of the Federal Trade Commission.
138 . Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal 
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986).
139 . Id. at 280.
140 . Id. at 282.
141 . See, e.g., Brandfonbrener, supra note 132, at 669.
142 . See, e.g., Belz, supra note 32, at 38; Webster, supra note 66.
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acting within the law.143
B. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
This  uncertainty  about  educational  privilege,  however, 
has a Heisenbergian quality—although at a given moment it 
may be impossible to tell whether over- or under-reliance on 
fair use dominates the academic community, one can easily 
tell  what  kinds  of  behavior  increase  or  decrease  an 
educator’s  tolerance for risk.  In particular,  publishers and 
other owners’  actions can impact  the price of  educational 
use.   Namely,  publishers  might  purposefully  decrease 
uncertainty about a particular legal rule in order to increase 
risk-averse behavior on the part of educators.  An intelligent 
and strategic publisher would thus seek to manipulate the 
variables  of  Craswell  and  Calfee’s  uncertainty  equation—
namely, adjusting the likelihood of being caught and the size 
of  possible  damages—in  order  to  encourage  large-scale 
under-reliance upon fair  use.144  Thus, both producers and 
consumers can predict the kinds of behavior that producers 
can  take  to  decrease  reliance  upon  fair  use  and  other 
privileges.
Under the rubric provided in the Calfee article, the size 
of  uncertainty  can  be  measured  as  the  proportionality  of 
enforcement-to-violation of a rule.145  “Large” uncertainty is 
that in which one’s level of, say, copyright infringement has 
no  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  being  caught—a  situation 
perhaps akin to that of many users of Napster and online 
143
1
. Hutchinson, supra note 32, at 2231–32 (“The majority of educators 
are unaware of the intricacies of copyright law. . . .  [They] largely do not 
follow the latest developments in copyright law.”).
144 . Note  that  the  fair  use  factors  themselves  admit  to  alteration 
through enforcement  strategies.  Because  the fourth  factor  under  §  107 
looks to the economic impact of a particular use, the mere existence of a 
market price may decrease the likelihood of a finding of fair use, insofar as 
some quantifiable market damage (as a loss of licensing fee) can always be 
shown so long as such a fee exists ex ante.  See Fisher, supra note 78, at 
1671.
145 . See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 138, at 286 (“Since the effect of 
x [defendant’s violation-level] on the likelihood of being punished was the 
only  factor  creating  an  incentive  to  overcomply,  the  incentive  to 
overcomply becomes weaker as this factor becomes smaller.  The extreme 
case,  where  shifts  in  the  defendant’s  level  of  x  have  no  effect  on  the 
chance of punishment (so that only the incentive to undercomply is left) is 
precisely  the  situation  modeled  by  traditional  deterrence  theorists  who 
concluded  that  uncertainty  about  enforcement  would  always  produce 
undercompliance.”).
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downloading services.  In a regime in which all violations of 
the rule are detected and enforced, there is no uncertainty. 
Thus, to “decrease” uncertainty is to increase the degree to 
which  large-scale  violators  are  punished  more  often  than 
small-scale  violators:  to  attempt  to  perfect  the 
proportionality  of  enforcement  to  violation.   In  the 
educational context, this would appear as visible, occasional 
suits brought against individual teachers; increasingly more 
common  suits  against  teachers  who  used  relatively  more 
copyrighted material;  and extremely common suits against 
large institutional copiers.
The  actual  enforcement  policies  of  owners  against 
educational  users do not (yet) exhibit such a tidy pattern. 
Owners  undoubtedly  disfavor  suits  against  individual 
educators and in educational contexts, and thus have mostly 
brought  suit  against  large  institutional  copiers  while 
neglecting smaller players.146  This enforcement strategy has 
the overall effect of reducing the “cost” of copyright use—
even infringing use—to educational users, because it creates 
relatively large uncertainty about whether they will ever, at 
all, be sued.
If enforcement were such that individual educators were 
never sued, then in fact their privileges would be free.  It is 
not completely unheard-of that producers would choose this 
course of action: in other contexts, theorists have suggested 
that copyright owners purposefully fail to bring suit against a 
particular  class  of  infringers,  in  order  to  undercut 
competitors  without  offending  antitrust  statutes147 and  to 
maintain market power by encouraging dependency on their 
products (particularly software) by non-business users.148
Nevertheless,  the import  of  this analysis is  in showing 
that the price of educational privilege remains volatile and 
easily influenced by the behaviors of copyright owners.  The 
uncertainty  inherent  in  the  legal  standards  governing 
146
1
. Only three reported cases  indicate suits  brought  directly  against 
non-profit educators.  See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1172 (9th Cir. 
1983); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 778–79 (8th Cir. 1962); MacMillan Co. 
v. King, 223 F. 862, 867–68 (D. Mass. 1914).
147 . See Danny  Ben-Shahar  &  Assaf  Jacob,  Selective  Enforcement  of 
Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANAL. 
& POL’Y 1118 (2004); see also Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust 
Issues, 114  LUC PAPERS–SERIE ECONOMIA IMPRESA 1 (2002) (noting that copyright 
enforcement can also be used as an anticompetitive strategy).
148 . Ramello, supra note 147, at 9–10.
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educational  use—the  kind  of  uncertainty  recognized  and 
often decried by unhappy educational users—allows for the 
enforcement strategies of particular firms to greatly increase 
or decrease the cost of educational uses.  Thus, although the 
Copyright  Act  does  considerable  work  in  separating  and 
defining  an  educational  market  of  reduced-cost  access  to 
copyrighted  works,  it  leaves  ample  room  for  owners  to 
influence price: raising or lowering perceived cost through 
the engineering of uncertainty, and affecting actual cost by 
changing enforcement strategies across markets.
V. CONCLUSION
By  redirecting  analytical  focus  towards  a  monetized 
conception of educational use—focusing on the factors and 
behaviors  capable  of  increasing  and  decreasing  the 
expected  cost  of  use—this  paper  has  attempted  to  offer 
better  ground  for  negotiations  between  educators  and 
copyright  owners  and  better  bases  for  criticism  of  the 
current  statutory  regime.   Translation  of  common 
educational  copyright  debates  into  terms  regarding  price, 
along with the statutory and practical factors impacting that 
price,  grounds  what  is  often  a  passionate,  unproductive 
debate. Providing a realistic articu-lation of the “balance” so 
often  sought  by  commentators  should  provide  a  better 
means  of  assessing  Congress’  success  in  achieving  a 
balance—a price—that provides compensation necessary to 
copyright  owners  without  pricing-out  users  whose  access 
would  provide  net  benefits  to  society.   Furthermore,  by 
analyzing structural components of the educational market 
that are defined by copyright law, this paper draws attention 
away from the sometimes demonic conceptions of copyright 
owners to reveal the areas of law that have allowed, if not 
promoted, owners’ strategic behavior.
Prices  for  educational  uses  already  exist,  and  thus 
should not be rejected as debased monetization of a “free” 
privilege; the bargaining power of both sides in educational 
debates  suffers  from  the  parties’  inability  to  bargain 
explicitly  about  costs.   Fair  use has  a  price.   Educational 
privilege has a price.  By making that price more explicit—at 
least  in  commentary,  if  not  in  the  law—educators  and 
copyright owners will posses a better vocabulary with which 
to bargain over the “balance” that optimizes their interests.
